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ABSTRACT. Present and potential petroleum development in Alaska is directly related to public-policy issues. The Prudhoe Bay oil 
discovery signaled the need for determination of a transportation route to market. Pipeline location became a function of political 
boundaries, with an all-American route preferred. Actual pipeline construction was dependent on settlement of land claims with Alaska’s 
indigenous peoples and the development of environmental safeguards. However, implicit  in the U.S. Congressional decision to build the 
pipeline was acceptance that expanded human activity would  impinge on northern Alaska’s pristine wilderness and that  there was probable 
risk of environmental damage. Another major public-policy decision was to allow construction of a pipeline for Prudhoe Bay natural gas. 
The problem that remains is uncertain economics; thus no Alaskan construction has occurred to date. Public policy also was advanced in 
windfall-profit taxation, and towards exploration and development of  new petroleum areas. Each policy has generated conflict between 
state and federal governments and private groups, but overall public-policy decisions and related judicial actions continue to favor a 
development stance. This is likely to persist as long as U.S. national attention is drawn to the uncertainty of foreign sources  for petroleum. 
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RÉSUMÉ.  Le dkveloppement actuel et futur de l’industrie pktrolifbre en Alaska est directement relie à questions de politique publique. 
La decouverte de petrole A la baie Prudhoe a signal6 le besoin d’une route pour la transport au marche. Le choix de l’emplacement des 
canalisations est maintenant determine en fonctions des frontibres politiques, une route complbtement amkricaine &ant pref6rCe. La 
construction actuelle de canalisations ddpendait des reclamations que faisaient sur les terrains les peuples indigbnes de l’Alaska, ainsi que 
de la mise en vigueur de sauvegardes visant le protection de l’environnement. Cependant, la decision du Congr6s amtricain  ayant trait ?I la 
construction du pipe-line acceptait le fait que la croissance dans I’activitk humaine affecterait la nature vierge de l’Alaska et causerait sans 
doute quelque dommage àl’environnement. Une autre decision majeure de politique publique entraînait la construction d’un gazoduc pour 
le gaz naturel de la baie Prudhoe. Le problbme qui se prksente est celui de facteurs economiques incertains; il  n’y a donc eu, ?I cet effet, 
aucune construction àdate en Alaska. La politique publique fut aussi prbsentee lors d’une periode d’imposition inattendue sur les profits, et 
visait  l’exploration et le dtveloppement de nouveaux domaines p6troWres. Chaque politique a cause quelque conflit entre les gouvernements 
fkdkral et d’etats et des groupes prives, mais les decisions en g6nbral et les actions judiciaires connexes continuent de favoriser un 
programme d’exploitation. Cette tendance se poursuivra pour aussi longtemps qu’il sera souligne aux Arnericains l’incertitude des marches 
de petrole &rangers. 
Mots clts: Alaska, petrole, politique publique 
Traduit pour le  journal par Maurice Guibord. 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 1969, the State of Alaska obtained $923 
million  from a petroleum lease sale located on the North 
Slope near Prudhoe  Bay. The apparent interest in the sale 
by  multinational  oil  companies  and the size of the lease 
bonus  payments were significant indicators that Alaska’s 
petroleum industry was in a major  expansion phase. 
Oil  and natural gas  development in Alaska is a relatively 
new  phenomenon. The first substantial commercial  field. 
was  discovered in  1957 near Kenai  and in conjunction  with 
petrochemical developments provided the initial instance 
of a petroleum  boom (Kresge et al., 1977).  When  Alaska 
became a state in January .1959, it  was  permitted by the 
U.S. Congress under the Statehood Act (U.S. Public Law 
85-508) to select from vacant unappropriated federal land 
within its borders an entitlement of over 40 million  ha - 
28% of the state’s land base. In the early 1960s, state 
government  selected a block of land  bordering the Arctic 
Ocean  and shortly thereafter several oil  companies  began 
test drilling.  In February 1968, the Atlantic  Richfield  Oil 
Company struck commercial quantities of  oil near Prud- 
hoe  Bay  and after some  additional  exploration  it  became 
evident that a giant  oil  field  had  been discovered. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate  public  policy 
as it relates to present and  potential  petroleum  develop- 
ment  in  Alaska.  This  will  involve  an  integration  of eco- 
nomic,  political,  and technical factors in  an analysis of the 
development process. An allied discussion of national 
legislation  directly  related to Alaskan  petroleum  activity 
will also be  helpful.  Given constraints on  length  and  poten- 
tial breadth of this topic, the paper will consider only 
major public-policy issues.  More  detailed  individual  accounts 
of specific issues will  be  noted in the references. 
Public-policy  issues  surrounding  petroleum  development 
are magnified by the high value of the resource and  its 
apparent abundance within  Alaska.  Taxation  and  royalty 
ownership of oil and natural gas  fields by the state and 
federal  governments will generate enormous revenues, at 
least through the year 2000. Recent estimates indicate that 
the State of Alaska will receive  approximately $50 billion 
(in  nominal dollars) between 1982 and 1998 just from  its 
royalty share and production taxes on Prudhoe Bay oil 
(Alaska Department of Revenue, 1982a). 
Oil  and  natural  gas  in  Alaska re found  both  on  and off 
shore. Proven reserves are located  on the North Slope  and 
near Kenai; however, apparently much  is  yet  undiscovered 
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(Table 1). The initial  size of Prudhoe Bay was estimated at 
9.4  billion barrels and, after almost five years of produc- 
tion, this has  fallen to approximately 7.3 billion barrels. 
Recent oil exploration has been directed to certain off- 
shore areas; one discussed later is the Beaufort Sea just 
north of Prudhoe Bay. Onshore, the area with the appar- 
ent greatest potential for oil  is  located  in theArctic  National 
Wildlife  Refuge, currently being considered for explora- 
tion by the federal government. Oil exploration is continu- 
ing in proximity to the Prudhoe Bay  oil  field (Fig. 1). 
PRUDHOE BAY  AND THE  OIL  PIPELINE 
With the discovery of Prudhoe Bay, a means to trans- 
port the crude oil to market became necessary. The Arctic 
Ocean  adjacent to the  North  Slope  remains  ice-laden  approx- 
imately 10 months per year. Sea transmission, the least 
expensive way to move oil, was judged not feasible at the 
point of discovery (Cicchetti, 1972).  After  some  investiga- 
tion, an overland pipeline  was  indicated to move  oil 1286 
km to an ice-free port in southern Alaska, thus facilitating 
low-cost ocean transportation to desired markets. The oil 
companies selected the sea route from southern Alaska in 
1969 and created the Alyeska  Pipeline Service Company 
to build  and  manage the pipeline (Lenzner, 1977). 
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TABLE 1. Oil and natural gas reserves of Alaska 
~ ~~ 
Oil Natural Gas 
(million  bbl.) (billion cu. ft.) 
Proven Reserves* 
Kenai 175  33  617 
North Slope 
Prudhoe Bay 7264  28  183 
Kuparuk 447  206 





low high  low  high 
Onshore 2500 14600  19800 62 300 
Offshore 4600  24  200 33 300 109  600 
TOTAL 7100 38  800 53 100  71 900 
*Oil or natural gas has been identified as extractable under current 
pricekost relationships and state of technology (source: Alaska Oil and 
Gas Conservation Commission, 1982). 
**Oil or natural gas as yet undiscovered which is expected to be extract- 
able under current  pricekost relationships and state of technology. A 
possible exception to the technology assumption is oil or natural gas 
found under arctic sea ice (source: U.S. Department of Interior, 1981b). 
Higher undiscovered potentially recoverable oil and gas estimates are 
available but may not be constrained by the assumptions of current 
codprice relationships and/or state of technology (e.g. National Petro- 
leum Council, 1981). 
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FIG. 1 .  Routing of Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline, major petroleum areas and general location of OCS basins (in  bold letters). 
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PUBLIC  POLICY AND PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT 
The route selected  found  disagreement in some  quar- 
ters. The  oil  implicitly  was destined for markets in other 
states in the United States. The oil shipped by super- 
tankers  from  southern  Alaska  could  efficiently  reach  Cali- 
fornia, but opponents of this  plan  suggested that the West 
Coast could not consume all the oil coming out of the 
Alaska  pipeline. 
Supertankers scheduled to move  oil  from  Valdez,  Alas- 
ka, the proposed  pipeline terminus, could reach U.S. East 
Coast  and Gulf Coast ports with surplus oil  only  by  sailing 
around the tip of South  America,  because  they  would  be 
too large for passage through the Panama Canal. The 
alternatives most  commonly presented were  movement of 
the oil  only  by supertankers from  Alaska  and either trans- 
shipment  by  pipeline  from the West  Coast eastward, or 
placement in smaller vessels for passage  through the Pan- 
ama Canal. Cicchetti (1972) argued that if the intended 
market for the oil  was other parts of the United States, 
then the combination land/water route through southern 
Alaska to the West Coast was  not the most  profitable for 
the oil  companies or the State of Alaska. An alternative 
all-land route through  Canada  was  preferable. However, if 
the purpose was to sell the surplus oil to Japan, then the 
Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline  was the better  economic  decision. 
An all-land route to midwestern  and eastern markets 
was, of course, not selected. A major factor was  unfavor- 
able reaction by the oil companies toward additional 
government  involvement  (Canadiangovernment  and  affected 
provinces) in the decision-making process associated with 
construction and operation of the pipeline.  One  potential 
problem  was  an estimated two-year  delay  in construction 
start-up (Cicchetti, 1972). A second issue was the political 
support given  by the State of Alaska  and others for build- 
ing an  all-American  oil  pipeline.  Increasing  isolationism in 
the United States, caused in part by the Arab  oil  boycott of 
October 1973, solidified support for the all-Alaska route. 
The Trans-Alaska Oil  Pipeline  Authorization  Act (U.S. 
Public  Law 93-153) passed the U.S.  Congress in  Novem- 
ber 1973, after a very close vote in the U.S. Senate. 
Two other factors were important to oil  field  develop- 
ment  and  pipeline construction: Native  land  claims  and 
environmental concerns. When  Alaska  was  purchased  from 
Imperial  Russia in 1867, land issues related to the indige- 
nous  Native  peoples of Alaska  became the responsibility 
of the United States government. The Organic  Act of 1884 
(US. Public Law, 48th Congress, Chapter 53) stated the 
desire for a Native  land settlement sometime in the future. 
When the area around  Prudhoe Bay  was  found to have 
great quantities of oil,  land  claims  had  not  yet  been settled. 
Since  pipeline construction permits  were  required across 
federal lands, a claims settlement became  paramount in 
allowing the construction phase to begin; this issue will  be 
discussed later in the paper. 
The second issue was that of environmental concern, 
particularly for the wilderness of northern Alaska. Many 
Native  peoples  have a “subsistence  lifestyle” which  depends 
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in  large  measure  on the harvesting of nearby wild  game. 
Just east of Prudhoe  Bay  in the Arctic  National Wildlife 
Refuge  is the calving  ground of one of the largest  caribou 
herds in North America.  With the exception of the few 
Native  peoples that live, hunt, and  fish in the northern 
interior and  along the Arctic Coast, much  of the area is 
pristine wilderness. The disturbance of this  wilderness by 
oil-field  development  and  pipeline  activity  was of major 
concern to environmental  groups as well as Alaska  Native 
peoples.  Legal action was undertaken to prevent  pipeline 
construction on the grounds that Native  land  claims  had 
not  been settled, severe environmental  damage  was  pos- 
sible  and requirements for an  environmental  impact state- 
ment  under the 1969 National  Environmental  Policy  Act 
(U.S. Public Law 91-190) had  not  been  met. 
Plans for pipeline construction were in the formulation 
stage  by 1969. Large movement of construction materials 
to the state occurred that year (Casavant et al . ,  1979). The 
122-cm diameter pipe was manufactured in Japan and 
began to arrive in Alaska in 1969. The  period 1971-1972 
saw a reduction in the flow of pipeline-related  materials 
because of various  legal battles over the construction pro- 
ject. Alyeska  Pipeline Service Company continued, coop- 
erated in, or was  influenced  by  various  engineering  and 
environmental  studies  which,  when  construction  was  finally 
undertaken, provided for a number of changes in the origi- 
nal  design. 
Pipeline construction activities began  in  early 1974 with 
construction of a road parallel to the planned pipeline 
route, from the Yukon River to Prudhoe Bay. Actual 
pipeline construction began  in 1975. During the next three 
years, a total of approximately $8 billion  was  invested in 
the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline; an additional $1.4 billion 
was  invested in the terminal at Valdez.  Oil-field  develop- 
ment  was also ongoing  during  this  period  and to the pres- 
ent. By early 1982, over 400 development  wells  were in 
place to supply the pipeline,  and investment in  field  devel- 
opment exceeded $5.6 billion. 
An area of  major  public-policy  emphasis  was  impact  on 
the northern ecosystem. Throughout the United States 
there was considerable interest in the wilderness envi- 
ronment of northern Alaska.  The  proposed  pipeline  was 
viewed  by  many as such a potential threat to  this  wilder- 
ness that its construction was  not justified. Major  issues 
included: 
1. Disruption of the caribou  and their range; 
2. Permafrost disturbances; 
3. Arctic construction as it  related to caribou  migration 
4. Earthquake potential; and 
5 .  Ocean-going tanker traffic  with  associated  pollution 
problems (Cicchetti, 1972). 
Studies were undertaken by many scientific groups to 
develop information concerning all the above points in 
order to find  ways to overcome, where  possible, associ- 
ated environmental impacts in anticipation that approval 
(and other fish  and  game  animals)  and permafrost; 
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for  pipeline  construction  would  be  forthcoming (e.g., Klein, 
1979; McKendrick  and  Mitchell, 1978; U.S.  Department 
of Interior, 1972). With  pipeline construction approved, 
stringent  environmental rules were  placed  on the pipeline 
company. This environmental protection was in large 
measures  responsible for the increase in construction costs 
eight times over initial investment estimates (Lenzner, 
1977). 
The  public-policy  decision to allow  pipeline construc- 
tion was based on two premises: (1)  the wilderness of 
northern  Alaska  would  no  longer  be  totally pristine; and 
(2) the risk of major  environmental  damage  could  not  be 
reduced to a zero-probability level. A societal decision 
through the U.S. Congress  was  made  to accept both  wil- 
derness  impact  and  possible  environmental  damage  because 
the value of the commodity  was  judged too great  relative 
to the alternative of  no production. 
From the perspective of 1982, the pipeline  has  had  few 
environmental  problems  since  it  began operation. A few 
minor leaks have occurred; all were cleaned up by the 
pipeline  company under government  supervision.  Initial 
concern about impact  on  migrating  animals  seems to have 
lessened. Caribou appear to be  coping  with the pipeline 
and the accompanying  haul road, but to what  degree  is 
controversial (Miller, 1980). North of the Yukon River, 
the pipeline appears to have  brought  little  change to the 
wilderness environment. However, the haul road was 
recently  opened to seasonal public  traffic as far north as 
Dietrich. This action could have significant impact on 
certain wilderness areas of northern Alaska through 
increased  human recreational and  commercial activity. 
ALASKA  NATURAL  GAS  TRANSMISSION SYSTEM  (ANGTS) 
Competition for selection of the pipeline route high- 
lighted the early phase of natural-gas  activity associated 
with Prudhoe Bay. A large amount of natural gas (28 
trillion ft3) was  found  in  conjunction  with the oil. It was 
estimated that a natural-gas production rate of 2 billion 
ft3.day” could  be  maintained  without  causing substantial 
physical  and  economic  damage to concurrent oil  produc- 
tion. The production time horizon was estimated at 25 
years. Three proposals  were  developed to transmit natural 
gas  from  Prudhoe  Bay to major U.S. markets. Two  were 
pipeline routes from  Alaska into Canada and  back  into the 
United States. The first route went eastward through the 
Arctic  National  Wildlife  Refuge  into the Yukon  and North- 
west Territories and  down the Mackenzie  River  system to 
southern markets. The second  paralleled the Trans-Alaska 
Oil  Pipeline ,route to Delta Junction and  then  followed the 
Alaska  Highway into the Yukon Territory and on to south- 
ern destinations. The third  followed the Trans-Alaska Oil 
Pipeline  to near Valdez,  where the natural gas  was to be 
liquefied  and  mqved  by ocean vessels to the south (Thomas 
and Casavant, 1977). 
In October 1976, the U.S. Congress passed the Alaska 
Natural  Gas Transportation Act (U.S. Public Law 94-586), 
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including a request for presidential advice on  which route 
to select. In  November 1977, Congress  approved the selec- 
tion of the Alaska  Highway route (U.S. Public Law 95-158) 
as a means for moving Prudhoe Bay natural gas. This  was 
done on the recommendation of President Carter, who 
believed that private financing  would  provide the neces- 
sary investment  capital  (Tussing  and  Barlow, 1979). The 
Canadian  government also approved  the route, which  would 
carry natural  gas  through a 122-cm diameter  pipeline  to 
U.S. markets. However, the proposed  pipeline  has  not  yet 
been  built, for reasons related to high  initial capitalization, 
potential cost overruns, and  technology.  The  two corpo- 
rate partners are not  large  enough to raise the required 
initial investment capital of up to $43 billion,  including $25 
billion  in Alaska. Private credit markets appear wary of 
the risks  involved.  Tussing  and  Barlow (1979) indicated 
that risk  is associated with (1) the possibility that Alaskan 
natural gas may cost more  than its market  value;  and (2) 
the possibility that unknown factors during construction 
and/or operation could raise the cost even further. The 
U.S.  Congress  did agree that a “rolled-in” pricing  scheme 
instead of an “old” incremental pricing approach could  be 
used for Prudhoe Bay gas (Tussing and Barlow, 1978). 
This  allowed  higher-priced  Alaskan natural gas to be aver- 
aged into lower-priced gas from other sources, thereby 
improving its competitive  position.  Since  approval of the 
route in 1977, the corporate partners have  asked for more 
than just rolled-in prices. Additional requests include: (1) 
an  all-events  tariff  which  allows the cost of the project to 
be borne by the consumer  even if the natural gas cannot be 
delivered; and (2) federal loan guarantees (Tussing and 
Barlow, 1979; Alaska Department of Revenue, 1979). 
Technical  problems  have  not  been  totally  resolved either. 
Design  difficulties appear more  numerous  than  those  related 
to placement of the oil  pipeline.  They  include the inherent 
danger of placing a large  high-pressure  gas  line  next to he 
Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline for the first 885 km. 
A State of Alaska report indicates that, as the price of  oil 
rises, the economics of Prudhoe  Bay  natural  gas  develop- 
ment  tend  to  improve  (Alaska  Department of Revenue, 
1979). However, large natural gas developments in  Mexico 
and  Canada  could  have adverse impacts  on  gas  pipeline 
prospects (Tussing and Barlow, 1979). Decontrol of all 
U.S. natural-gas prices by 1985 could make alternative 
projects increasingly  profitable  and  provide  stiff  competi- 
tion to ANGTS. 
In early 1981, the major Prudhoe Bay oil producers 
signed  an  agreement  with Northwest Energy  Company to 
provide 30% of the equity and arrange for 30% of the debt 
financing on ANGTS. The 1977 presidential  decision  and 
subsequent  Congressional  resolution  specifically  prohibited 
oil-producer ownership in the pipeline  and  an act of the 
U.S. Congress  was required to alter that status. 
In December 1981, a joint Congressional resolution 
(U.S. Public Law 97-93) approved President Reagan’s 
recommendation of a waiver of law pursuant to the Alaska 
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Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976. This  resolution 
permitted (1) North Slope producers to hold an equity 
interest in the gas line project, (2) inclusion of the gas 
conditioning  plant  in the project,  and (3) pre-commencement 
billing  of U.S. consumers before the project is completed. 
Certain  Canadian portions of ANGTS are already  under 
construction to facilitate movement of Canadian  natural 
gas. The eventual construction of the Alaskan  portion of 
ANGTS  still  remains  highly uncertain. As  of this  writing, 
Northwest Energy  Company  has  terminated  most  Alas- 
kan  employees  and the State of Alaska is closing its gas 
pipeline  surveillance  office. The federal office is expected 
to close in October 1982. 
MAJOR NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
1971 Alaska Native  Claims Settlement Act ( U S .  Public Law 
92-203) (ANCSA). Oil discoveries on the North Slope of 
Alaska in  April 1967 were the major catalyst for legislation 
to resolve  land  claims  by  Alaska’s  indigenous  people to 
the federal government. Federal and state government 
officials  perceived that without the land  claims settlement, 
legal actions initiated  by Native peoples  could delay, and 
possibly prevent, construction of the oil  pipeline. 
Settlement passed  by the U.S. Congress  allowed  Alas- 
ka’s Native peoples to Select 17.8 million  ha  of unappro- 
priated  and unreserved federal lands (12% of the land  in 
Alaska) and provided a cash settlement of $962.5 million, 
$500 million to be  paid  by the State of Alaska. It extinguished 
all future land claims within Alaska by Native people. 
Federal land to be crossed by the proposed  pipeline corri- 
dor was  placed  in a reserved status before  Native  land 
selection  could  begin. The cash payment  was in  lieu  of lost 
selection rights for patented state and private lands or 
reserved federal land. Specifically, the Native  peoples of 
Alaska  could  not select the land associated with the Prud- 
hoe  Bay  oil  field because it  had  already  been patented by 
state government. 
1973 Trans-Alaskan  Oil  Pipeline Authorization Act ( U S .  Pub- 
lic Law 93-153). The construction of the Trans-Alaska Oil 
Pipeline  was  delayed for two major reasons: Native  land 
claims  and  environmental concerns. The first was  solved 
with  ANCSA. Environmental concerns were presented in 
a legal sense through  various court actions. One approach 
was to prevent issuing of permits to build the line by 
indicating that an environmental impact statement (EIS) 
required under the 1969 National  Environmental  Policy 
Act (US. Public Law 91-190) was  not  complete.  After the 
EIS was finished, a primary tactic was to attempt to dis- 
credit the effort in further court actions. The Pipeline 
Authorization  Act as passed by  Congress  prevented fur- 
ther legal  action  by  environmental  and other interested 
groups unless instituted within 60 days of enactment. No 
such action occurred. 
This  legislation also affected  marketing. It dictated that 
crude oil  passing  through the line  could  only  be  sold to 
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customers in the United States. During  early 1982, exclud- 
ing in-state  use of 50 000 barrels  per day, an  average 650 OOO 
barrels per day of Alaskan  oil  were  sold to U.S.  markets 
on the West Coast. The remaining 900 000 barrels per day 
were  sold to East and  Gulf  Coast markets (Alaska  Depart- 
ment of Revenue, 1982b). This latter amount increases the 
average cost of crude oil transported from  Prudhoe  Bay, 
for reasons including the much greater distance involved 
and the bottleneck of the Panama Canal. The consequence 
is reduced  wellhead  value for the oil producers and the 
State of Alaska.  (Wellhead  value  is  determined  by  sub- 
tracting the marine transportation charges  and oil  pipeline 
tariff  from the sale  price at crude oil  refinery.) 
A marketing alternative is to allow the oil that is excess 
over West  Coast needs to be  sold to Japan. A like  quantity 
of  Mexican and/or Middle Eastern oil  purchased  by  Japan 
could then be shipped directly to the U.S East or Gulf 
Coast. Politically, this would require permission of the 
U.S. Congress. It is uncertain whether the event will 
occur; however, recent American  and Japanese govern- 
ment  discussions  have  taken  place.  The  major  public-policy 
benefits  from a United States perspective would  be  diplo- 
matic, the sharing of a scarce resource with a political  ally, 
and economic, reduction of the transportation costs for 
Alaskan oil with a concomitant increase in its taxable 
wellhead value. 
1976 Alaska Natural Gas Transportation  Act ( U S .  Public Law 
94-586). The legislation  was the culmination of route selec- 
tion  efforts for moving  Alaskan natural gas to southern 
U.S. markets. This act required the U.S. President to 
advise the U.S.  Congress on which route was  most  feasi- 
ble. After lengthy deliberations, a presidential decision 
was  made  in  November 1977 to utilize the Alaska  High- 
way route (U.S. Public Law 95-158). Congress, in passing 
the subsequent Natural Gas  Policy  Act (US. Public  Law 
95-621) in November 1978, suggested that the only  federal 
subsidy  should  be the rolled-in  pricing  mechanism  described 
earlier. 
Tussing and Barlow (1979) indicated that Northwest 
Energy  Company  emphasized the risk-reduction aspects 
of the Alaska  Highway  pipeline route compared  with the 
two alternative gas pipeline proposals. Further, it was 
implied  that  through  risk  reduction,  private  (non-government) 
financing could be obtained for the project. Even with 
passage of the waiver  package (U.S. Public  Law 97-93) in 
1981, which transferred some  project  risk to the oil  com- 
panies  who  own the natural gas, and to the consuming 
public,  private-sector  financing  has  not  been  secured.  What 
appears to have occurred is that public-policy  decisions 
have  been  made  to  build a pipeline,  including  entering  into 
a treaty with Canada, while the economics of the situation 
tend to favor project cancellation. Moreover, the Alaska 
Natural Gas Transportation Act apparently mandates the 
Alaska  Highway route, so consideration of alternate pipe- 
line systems for Prudhoe Bay  gas  will  require  new  Con- 
gressional action. 
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From a technical standpoint, there is a disagreement 
over the continued  reinjection of natural gas  and its effect 
on  Prudhoe  Bay  oil production. Economides (1981) argues 
that gas  reinjection  must  end around 1985 to prevent seri- 
ous  impact  on production from Prudhoe Bay  (Sadlerochit 
oilpool). Apparently, the major alternative view is that the 
reinjection process is  not so time-sensitive that gas  reinjec- 
tion cannot continue past the mid-1980s.  Alaska state law 
prohibits the flaring  of natural gas at Prudhoe  Bay  (Alaska 
Statutes 40.01) so some form of transportation system 
eventually will  be necessary to remove  gas  from the field if 
maximum  oil production is to be obtained. 
1980 Crude Oil Windfall Proft Tax (U.S. Public Law 96-223). 
In 1979 President Carter began  to decontrol the price of 
domestically  produced crude oil. As part of that decision, 
he requested that the U.S. Congress  place a windfall  profit 
tax  on the added revenue which  would accrue to the  oil 
companies as aresult of the deregulation.  Congress  passed 
the legislation in  April  1980. The windfall  profit  tax  is  not a 
tax  on  profits  but  an excise tax on a portion of the incre- 
mental  difference  between a calculated  base  price  and the 
market-determined  price  (McDonald,  1981).  In the case of 
Prudhoe  Bay  oil (Sadlerochit oil  pool), the base  price  is 
approximately $12.81 per barrel; in succeeding periods, 
this base price will be adjusted for inflation. The tax is 70% 
of the  incremental  difference  between the base  price  and 
the wellhead price. In 1981, the monthly average wellhead 
price,  unweighted,  was $23.53. Estimated  fiscal  year 1981 
distribution of wealth  from the Prudhoe Bay field, less 
cost of field production, was 45% to the federal govern- 
ment, 33% to the State of Alaska, and 22% to the oil 
companies  (Alaska Department of Revenue, 1982b). 
On a national basis, including  oil  produced  in  all areas of 
the United States, the tax is estimated to provide the 
federal  government $228 billion  in  additional revenue over 
an 11-year  period (U.S. Congress, 1980). Tax receipts do 
not reflect payment from oil owned by state and local 
governments  and  American Indians, including the State of 
Alaska’s ‘/8 royalty share of Prudhoe Bay oil, because 
these groups  were exempted in the legislation. 
An interesting political division occurred during the 
formulation of the tax. The  U.S. House of Representa- 
tives passed  legislation to tax state-owned  oil unless the 
revenue  was  used for public education. The U.S. Senate 
exempted state-owned oil under the legislation  it passed. 
During free conference committee the U.S. Senate ver- 
sion  won out. 
The  conflict hat emerged  between the two  houses of the 
U.S. Congress reflects, to a large measure, the composi- 
tion of each. The U.S. House of Representatives is 
apportioned by population, thereby largely representing 
the consuming states of the East Coast and  Midwest. The 
U.S. Senate is  geographically  determined  and represents, 
to a much greater degree, the western states where a large 
part of America’s natural resources, and  correspondingly 
few  of its people, are located. The western states generally 
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form a loose  coalition to reduce the impact of “adverse” 
legislation directed at their resources. The  passage of the 
Senate version of the windfall  profit  tax  legislation  is  an 
example of this  coalition’s  effectiveness  and may  be the 
forerunner of  many more. 
1980 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation  Act (U.S. 
Public Law 96-487). The U.S.  Congress  passed the Alaska 
Lands Act in December 1980. Almost 40 million ha of 
federal  land  were  placed in national parks and  monuments, 
forests, wildlife refuges, and recreation areas. The Act 
encouraged the development of an oil and gas leasing 
program on non-restricted federal lands in Alaska.  The 
Act directed the U.S. Secretary of the Interior to carry out 
a study of all federal lands on the North Slope, excluding 
the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska, which was 
covered by other legislation (U.S. Pubiic Law 94-258). 
The purpose of the study was to assess the oil  and  gas 
resources of these lands, as well as wilderness  needs  and 
characteristics. The Secretary is to submit  this study no 
later than eight years after the date of enactment of the 
Alaska Lands Act. 
More significantly, the Secretary of the Interior was 
directed to provide a comprehensive inventory of the Arc- 
tic  National  Wildlife  Refuge.  Within  two years of enact- 
ment, the Secretary must establish initial guidelines 
governing exploratory activities for the coastal plain  por- 
tion of the refuge  (Canning  River to Aichilik  River).  How- 
ever, production of  oil and  gas  from the Arctic  National 
Wildlife  Refuge is prohibited, as is all  commercial  leasing 
activity, unless authorized by a further act of the U.S. 
Congress. , 
BEYOND PRUDHOE BAY 
Petroleum development in Alaska gained momentum 
with Prudhoe Bay. A logical question to ask is “what 
happens next?” The original Prudhoe Bay  field  will  begin 
to decline by  1987 (Tussing, 1981). 
Exploratory drilling  has occurred offshore  and onshore 
near Prudhoe  Bay for a number of years. Expectations 
have  developed  within  many oil companies  that  the  Beaufort 
Sea could  be the next  major  oil  field  in  America.  Addition- 
ally, there are two major onshore reservoirs adjacent to 
the main Prudhoe Bay field, Kuparuk and Prudhoe Bay- 
Lisburne, and  one  major onshore reservoir to the east, 
Point  Thomson. 
In December 1979, a Beaufort Sea oil  and  gas lease sale 
was held in Fairbanks, Alaska (Alaska Department of 
Commerce  and  Economic Development, 1979).  High  bids 
on 70 tracts offered totaled $1 billion, to be  divided  nearly 
equally  between the state and federal governments. One 
unique  public-policy event occurred. Alaska  selected 17 
of its most  promising tracts and  sold  them  with  no  bonus 
payment  but  on the basis of percentage of net  profit  paid  to 
the state. The high net-profit  bid for one tract was 93%.  If 
no  oil  is  found on any of these tracts, the state has  foregone 
the pre-drilling  bonus payment. To date, initial  explora- 
PUBLIC POLICY AND PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT 
tion activities appear highly  promising.  Artificial  islands 
have  been constructed and  drilling operations are under- 
way  in several locations. 
Expanded  drilling  in the Beaufort Sea was  initially  ham- 
pered by a series of  legal actions filed  by the North Slope 
Borough, two Native villages, and nine environmental 
groups. Their concern centered on two issues: (1) the sale 
should  not  include areas beyond a group of barrier islands 
because of major sea-ice problems; and (2) significant 
environmental  damage may occur, particularly to sea life, 
if any part of the sale goes forth. Court  injunctions  pre- 
venting  drilling were lifted on  state  and federal submerged 
lands in 1980 with further state court action  possible. 
There appears to be  valid concern that seasonally  mov- 
ing sea ice, particularly  seaward of the islands, could pose 
a serious threat to the drilling  installations  and associated 
feeder pipelines.  Technology for drilling  and  related  pipe- 
line construction in severe sea-ice conditions is in the 
development stage (National Petroleum Council, 1981). 
Should  technology  fail, serious oil  pollution of ocean  waters 
under the ice is possible. The  outcome could  be severe 
localized  damage of the marine  environment and major 
losses in sea mammal populations (US. Department of 
the Interior, 1979a). 
In 1976, the U.S. Department of the Interior was  given 
management of the Naval Petroleum Reserve Number 4 
and  its  name  was  changed to the National  Petroleum  Reserve 
in Alaska (NPR-A) (Fig. 1) (US. Public Law 94-258). 
Although test drilling  had  been carried out intermittently 
by the U.S. Navy for many years, mapping of sub-surface 
strata rather than oil exploration was  emphasized.  The 
Department of the Interior has  changed the management 
approach, and conducted a 0.6 million-ha  oil lease sale in 
January 1982. A disappointing $62 million  was  bid for 29 
leases on 59 offered tracts; the Secretary of the Interior 
subsequently voided four leases because of  low  bid prices. 
A new lease sale  totaling 1.5 million  ha  was conducted in 
late May 1982; only 12 out of 209 offered tracts were sold, 
for  approximately $10 million.  Apparently,  there are numer- 
ous smaller oil fields scattered throughout the NPR-A 
which  could  become  commercially  viable  with a pipeline 
extension from Prudhoe Bay (U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 1979b). 
Another potential area is the Arctic  National  Wildlife 
Refuge. The size of deposits in the refuge,  beyond esti- 
mates, is  not  known since no  drilling  has occurred to date. 
This is a highly  promising  geological area, particularly in 
comparison  with the NPR-A.  Oil  per square mile  could  be 
nearly  eight  times greater if average values are considered 
(Mast et ul., 1980). Any development is controversial, 
however, due to significant wildlife conflicts. The 1980 
Alaska Lands Act (U.S. Public Law 96-487) allowed for 
exploratory drilling  but  not production. Development in 
the refuge  is  likely to be  slow. 
Onshore petroleum activity in Alaska has increased 
awareness of the offshore potential. Politically,  offshore 
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activity  is  largely the responsibility of the federal govern- 
ment. It both  manages the activity  and retains all  lease 
bonuses  and royalties from  oil  and  gas  found  off  Alaska’s 
coast on the outer continental  shelf  and  slope  (OCS)  beyond 
the three-mile  limit. A policy  decision  was  made by the 
Reagan  Administration to carry forward with  some  mod- 
ification the Carter Administration’s  OCS  leasing  program 
(U.S. Department of Interior, 1981a). This  program  includes 
16 areas through 1985. Alaska  plans to coordinate adjacent 
state offshore lease sales (within the three-mile  limit)  with 
the federal  OCS  program. Substantial concern has  been 
expressed regarding development of offshore oil fields 
near major  salmon  and  king crab populations.  Areas of 
particular concern are the massive  red  salmon  fishery in 
Bristol  Bay (Northern Aleutian Basin), where the planned 
April 1983 sale  has  been deleted, and the king crab fishery 
in Saint  George  Basin. To date, no substantial quantities 
of  oil and  gas  have  been reported in  any  major  offshore 
drilling  efforts on Alaska’s  OCS  except  for state submerged 
lands in the Beaufort Sea  and Cook Inlet. 
It is  unlikely that another field the size of Prudhoe Bay 
will  be discovered. This  oilfield  did  provide the economic 
incentive to develop a transportation system to arctic 
Alaska  and spurred both onshore and  offshore  exploration 
throughout Alaska. The outcome will likely be oil and 
natural-gas  production  from  commercially  viable  smaller 
fields  well into the next century. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Native  land  claims settlement, the major  Alaskan  public- 
policy event of the 1970s, facilitated  petroleum  develop- 
ment  in  Alaska.  Given  this catalyst, the significant  petro- 
leum  public-policy issues are the decisions to ( 1 )  explore, 
produce, and transport; (2) protect the environment; and 
(3) tax the production. These three policy goals can, if 
weighted  differently,  lead to alternative  outcomes. If explo- 
ration  and  production are expanded, environmental  pro- 
tection becomes  more  difficult. If environmental protec- 
tion  is  emphasized  and its cost borne by the oil companies, 
cost of operation will increase, thus potentially  reducing 
production  and exploration. Increased taxation  can reduce 
production and exploration  and the level of accompanying 
environmental  protection. All  of the examples  reflect  public- 
policy  decisions by government; in the case of Alaska,  not 
just one  government  but two, federal  and state. It is possi- 
ble, even likely, that each government may differ in its 
weighing of these three policy issues. One observation 
seems rather safe, however; as long as U.S. national atten- 
tion  is  drawn to the uncertainty of foreign sources of oil, 
decisions at any  level of government  to stop future petro- 
leum  activity  in  Alaska  will  be overturned. This  type of 
uncertainty tends to increase social  value of the resource, 
which in turn weighs  strongly  against  environmental con- 
cerns which  block development. 
The oil  pipeline continues to transport crude oil  outside 
Alaska to other U.S. markets. A state public-policy  deci- 
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sion  to support the development of in-state processing of 
Prudhoe Bay oil and natural gas before transshipment 
would  not  necessarily  run counter to national objectives. 
This  topic  has  been  widely discussed in Alaska  and  has  led 
to construction and operation of a small refinery near 
Fairbanks which produces heating  oil,  diesel  and jet fuel. 
World-scale  processing operations at several locations in 
Alaska are also  being discussed. The overriding factor in 
any  petrochemical  development is processing cost rela- 
tive to market price, and  Alaska tends to be a high-cost 
area. State government  subsidization of the industry  would 
likely  facilitate development, but  such  an approach would 
create substantial public debate. 
Finally, Prudhoe Bay has greatly influenced the eco- 
nomic  position of the State of Alaska. It may  make the 
state one of the wealthier  governments in the world.  One 
might  hypothesize a growing  disquiet  between the state 
and federal governments over the transfer of large  sums of 
money  from  American  oil consumers to Alaska state gov- 
ernment. Other oil-producing states in the U.S. will have 
similar  problems. The  outcome may  be  discriminatory tax 
laws  passed  against  oil-producing states if the issue  can  be 
forced  through the U.S. Congress. This, then, will become 
another area of conflict  and controversy associated  with 
Alaskan  petroleum development. 
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